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A b s t r a c t 
A democracy is considered to be consolidated when no major political grouping attempts to 
overthrow the democratic regime or promote violence in order to seize any part of the territory 
from the existing state. Democracy becomes 'the only game on the town’ even when the state faces 
economic and political difficulties and challenges, all political groups believe and seek to find a 
solution within the constitutional order and democratic procedures. Namely, before any situation 
and difficulty in the state, the political forces in the country do not seek to solve problems by 
undemocratic means.  
 
In addition to the main factors mentioned by various authors, in the case of Kosovo, a key problem 
for the consolidation of democracy, consolidation and positioning in the international arena is the 
process of normalization of relations with Serbia and cooperation and effective functioning of the 
three main constitutional institutions; The Assembly, the President and the Prime Minister of 
Kosovo, as the main pillars of the system policy based on the principle of separation of powers. 
In principle, their greatest contribution to the consolidation of democracy in Kosovo is, the election 
and exercise of constitutional functions is done in accordance with the principles and norms set by 
the Constitution, enjoys the confidence of the majority of the population in the country, and there 
are no significant political forces and nor the attitudes of the public trying to replace democracy 
with authoritarian forms of government. In other words, echoing the metaphorical expression of 





After a nine-year period of international administration, Kosovo 
declared its independence in 2008 and since then has held 
parliamentary and local elections consistently, joining the group 
of newer Third World democracies.  These parliamentary and 
local elections, considered free and fair in accordance with 
international standards, further strengthened its legitimacy as a 
democratic state, with the ultimate aim of consolidating 
democracy. 
 
Welcoming Kosovo’s recent free and fair elections, Zahir Tanin, 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) stressed the need to form a new government without 
delay, resume dialogue with Serbia, and quell the rise in 
inflammatory nationalist rhetoric (document S/2017/640). 
 
Since then, a cycle of parliamentary elections has begun, and so 
far four elections have been held. The governments that emerged 
from these elections did not have long lives. They continue to be 
short-lived to this day. Without of any exception, no government 
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has completed its full governing mandate and has not survived 
early elections. 
 
In fact, after Kosovo's declaration of independence, there are still 
many tasks to be fulfilled, conditions to be established, attitudes 
and habits to be cultivated before the democratic transition phase 
is completed and its 'maturity' to be assessed as a consolidated 
democracy. Then, what are the characteristics of a consolidated 
democracy? Many democracy scholars list a number of 
conditions and characteristics that a democracy must contain to 
be considered consolidated. Externally, a democracy can be 
considered consolidated when no major international entity 
disputes it in territorial terms or no ethnic grouping within the 
territory seeks separation from the state. Internally, however, 
among other things, a democratic regime is established within the 
territory and no major actors within the state, social, economic, 
political or institutional make any attempt to establish an 
undemocratic regime. Thus, when a strong public opinion is 
created, even amid major economic problems and deep 
discontent, it is believed that democratic procedures and 
institutions are the most appropriate way to govern social and 
political life, i.e. when support for alternative anti-regime forces 
is too little present or more or less isolated from pro-democratic 
forces (Linz, Stephan, 1996). 
 
2. Consolidation of Democracy 
What can certainly be said about democracy is that numerous 
definitions have been given in order to define it. Aristotle had 
defined democracy as a form of state regulation whose main 
characteristic is equality, in which everyone participates in 
power, but in which the rule of law (Aristotle, 1978, p. 161). What 
Aristotle's remarks show is that democracy is acceptable to all 
citizens, since they are elected and can elect their own 
representatives who govern them, through free and democratic 
elections held in certain periodic cycles. 
 
Relying on John Adams' definition of democracy, it is rooted in 
the idea that elected officials should think for the good of the 
people, feel and reason like him, and often be held accountable 
for the way they govern (Adams, 2015). 
 
Across countries around the world, democracy is presented in 
different forms, somewhere it has better representation and a 
greater expression of freedom, and in other countries it is lacking. 
Moreover, it is the legislation that properly regulates the exercise 
of democracy, through the separation of powers, the 
establishment of control and balance in order to promote 
equitable distribution of power within the political sphere. 
 
The global developments, namely the modernization and 
development of the economy of the third world, which was 
followed by the growth and development of the middle class and 
its education; changes in the Catholic Church in relation to 
individual rights; the weakening and disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the emergence of the Soviet bloc of leading European 
countries, their determination for democracy, and the influence of 
the United States and the European Union in supporting these 
democracies were among the major factors influencing the 
creation of the ‘third wave  of democracy’ highlighted by Samuel 
Huntington in his book “Third Wave: Democratization at the End 
of the Twentieth Century” (Huntington, 1991). 
 
During this period, many totalitarian regimes in countries around 
the world have been replaced by democratic systems. While this 
is a major achievement, problems emerge later in strengthening 
and stabilizing these new democracies. Because maintaining and 
developing democracy is as difficult a task as it is to set. In all 
these democratic transitions, the biggest concerns are how to set 
up, strengthen and stabilize new regimes so as not to backtrack 
on totalitarian regimes, now that the spread of democracy in other 
countries has slowed. This has led political scientists and other 
actors in new democracies to increasingly focus on using the term 
"consolidation of democracy" (Schedler, 1998). 
 
In the first phase defined as the transition to democracy we are 
dealing with the period of establishment of democratic 
institutions. The main element of this first phase is free elections, 
where political parties compete for representation in 
representative institutions after the fall of totalitarian dictatorship. 
In general terms, this is the stage in which societies embark on 
the path of transition and create rules that determine how new 
democratic institutions will function, rules that they then 
incorporate into their constitutions (Kerasimeonov, 2012). 
 
In essence, the consolidation of democracy is the process of 
achieving widespread and profound legitimacy, so all important 
political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that a 
democratic regime is appropriate and appropriate for them and 
society as a whole. 
 
As Linz and Alfred Stephan put it, in short, there are three 
minimum conditions that must be met before we can talk about 
consolidating democracy: 
 
- Exercising state sovereignty across the state, a functioning state 
is a condition, 'sine qua non' in modern politics, as free and 
authoritative elections cannot be held, winners cannot exercise 
the monopoly of legitimate power and citizens cannot 'protect 
their rights effectively. 
 
 95 
- Democracy cannot be thought of as consolidated until a 
democratic transition is made. It is an indispensable, but by no 
means sufficient, condition for the completion of a democratic 
transition that requires free and contested elections. 
- No regime should be called a democracy unless its rulers govern 
democratically. If freely elected leaders (no matter the size of 
their majority) violate the constitution, violate the rights of 
individuals and minorities, impose legitimate legislative 
functions, and thus fail to rule within the boundaries of a rule of 
law, regimes are not a democracy (Linz, Stephan, 1996). 
 
Robert Dahl describes the basic political institutions of 
representative government in a modern democratic country, 
pointing out that it only happens in an ideal society, and rarely in 
current practice, and goes on to say that the existence of a 
democracy presupposes that all citizens its increased set of 
fundamental rights, freedoms and opportunities, including: 
 
o the right to vote in the election of officials in a free 
and fair manner; 
o the right to run for state office by election; 
o the right to free expression; 
o the right to form and participate in independent 
political organizations, including political parties; 
o the right to benefit from independent sources of 
information; 
o the rights to any other freedom and opportunity that 
may be necessary for the effective functioning of 
large-scale political institutions of democracy (Dahl, 
1997). 
 
From this, it can be concluded that elections are the basis of a 
democratic society through which representative institutions are 
created, which bear the responsibility to run the state, and with it 
society, based on the will of the majority of citizens, but this is 
not all. So it remains that the organization of free and democratic 
elections and their quality and progress is one of the key points in 
assessing new and transition democracies. Given this, Kosovo has 
held credible and relatively well-run elections, but its institutions 
remain weak, and rampant corruption has caused deep public 
mistrust in its government (Freedom House, 2020). 
 
In most cases, holding free and democratic elections and fulfilling 
the basic political institutions of governance required by Dahl 
takes place, but in a modern democratic country there are still 
many tasks to be fulfilled for his democracy to be considered 
consolidated.  
 
In the case of Kosovo, in addition to key factors; talks on 
normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations, fulfillment of 
obligations arising from these talks, regional cooperation and 
development of internal dialogue are one of the main challenges 
for the consolidation of democracy and critical to all this is the 
cooperation and functioning of the three main constitutional 
institutions; The Assembly, the President and the Prime Minister. 
In this short study, I will address, among other things, the 
importance of the functioning of these key constitutional 
institutions; The Assembly, the President and the Prime Minister, 
in consolidating democracy. 
 
3. Functioning of key Constitutional 
Institutions 
The methodology of studying the functioning of the three main 
constitutional institutions of the Republic of Kosovo will be based 
on the analysis of the constitutional framework, relevant 
legislation and decisions of the Constitutional Court, as well as 
the practice of functioning and cooperation of political parties. 
 
If we focus on the analysis of the literature on the transition to 
democracy during the Third Wave, we notice that it is focused on 
internal factors that influence the consolidation of democracy. An 
important exception is Huntington's Third Wave (1991), in which 
the author points out that in the consolidation of democracy, 
external forces can influence decisively. 
 
The elections of October 6, 2019 brought out the Vetëvendosje 
Movement of Albin Kurti, the first political entity with 26% of 
the votes, followed by the Democratic League of Kosovo LDK 
with about 25%. After the results were confirmed, the two parties 
began talks on forming a government, which were by no means 
easy and lasted a long time. Finally, on February 4, 2020, Mr. 
Albin Kurti was appointed Head of Government. This 
government lasted only 50 days. The no-confidence motion was 
sought by the LDK coalition partner, who was unhappy with the 
way Mr. Kurti was approaching talks on normalizing Serbia-
Kosovo relations and co-operation agreements with countries in 
the region. 
 
After that, Kosovo held extraordinary elections, on February 14, 
2021. Vetëvendosje Movement came out first, but this time with 
50.28% of the vote. 
 
Election of the government of Mr. Kurti was appointed 
immediately after the constitution of the Assembly of Kosovo. 
Following these elections, the election of the president would take 
place, a post which had remained in office after the resignation of 
President Thaqi, after the lawsuit was filed by the Special 




Candidate Mrs. Vjaosa Osmani managed to be elected president 
after difficult talks with the LDK and the assistance provided by 
the quint ambassadors, who had supported Kosovo's 
independence. 
 
The approach of the Kosovo governments to the dialogue for the 
normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations seems to have been a 
measure of their longevity in governance. Since the beginning of 
these talks, no elected government has been able to complete its 
full governing mandate, plunging the country into ongoing 
political crises. 
 
One of the key factors in the consolidation of democracy in 
Kosovo is the effective functioning of the main state institutions; 
The Assembly (Kosovo Const. Chapt. IV.), President (Kosovo 
Const. Chapt. V) and the Government (Kosovo Const. Chapt. VI), 
which in the Constitution constitutes the main pillars of the 
political system based on the principle of separation of powers. 
 
The constitution of Kosovo, as a result of the political 
circumstances of the time it was adopted, was created in view of 
its main premises, namely the inclusion of the Ahtisaari Package 
and the maintenance of the separation of powers within the 
borders of the parliamentary republic. 
 
Amendments to the Constitution of Kosovo, which are considered 
necessary to complete certain processes in the country, while in 
principle possible, they still remain practically impossible at 
present, experts in constitutional legal affairs and political experts 
in the country say. 
 
The constitution of Kosovo, as the highest legal act of the country, 
turned out to have many gaps, obstacles that were highlighted 
during the consolidation of the new state and the efficient 
functioning of state institutions. The provisions of the 
Constitution are characterized by contradictions, inconsistencies, 
ambiguities, ambiguities of concepts and notions as well as 
terminological omissions which cause great difficulties in the 
correct interpretation in the implementation in practice (GAP 
Institution, 2011). 
 
A small number of changes have been made to the Constitution 
in order to round out certain processes in place. Some others, 
while possible in principle, still remain virtually impossible at 
present as a result of the adjustments within the constitution itself. 
In general, these changes relate to the following aspects: The 
transformation of the Kosovo Security Force, into the Kosovo 
Armed Forces or changes to the electoral system in the country, 
but others, remain hostage to the hitherto impossibility of 
constitutional change. 
At the same time, Kosovo's main institutions are facing a number 
of challenges in exercising their constitutional functions, causing 
confidence in them to diminish in Kosovo's public opinion and 
society. 
 
Assembly of Kosovo - The main representative institution, since 
the 2014 elections, has begun to face the decline of confidence it 
should enjoy. During the year, he faced a six-month blockade that 
hampered its constitution and the exercise of its basic 
constitutional functions. It was only after the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court that he succeeded in constituting and 
continuing the exercise of his mandate functions, without being 
able to complete his full mandate. An almost similar situation 
arose after the 2019 extraordinary elections, where its organs 
were created following a procedure questioned by the opposition, 
with the tendency that the procedure for the election of the top 
assembly would once again be referred to the Constitutional 
Court. 
 
Members of the Assembly of Kosovo fail to perform their main 
function of lawmakers in the name of the common good. Their 
legislative activity is mainly driven by private interests, they are 
barricaded against group and party interests and there is no 
concession on the key issues. The ruling coalition has had limited 
success in pushing ahead with EU reforms and building 
consensus on key strategic issues for Kosovo, but continued 
political fragmentation and polarization have negatively affected 
the role of the Assembly and affected the effectiveness of the 
government. Frequent absence of parliamentarians from plenary 
sessions and continued political polarization hampered the 
legislative activity of the assembly, in particular due to the 
irresponsible behavior of some parliamentarians involved in the 
use of tear gas to obstruct the work of the Assembly (Commission 
Staff Working Document Kosovo, 2018). 
 
The exercise of the Assembly's political control over the 
Government, in the capacity of the supreme body of 
representative power, in fact remains one of its most significant 
weaknesses. This comes as a result of the party's strict discipline 
over its MPs and the executive's determination to impose its will. 
This is the main reason why one of the main functions of the 
Assembly, which is to exercise its parliamentary control over the 
government, is not playing its role of a corrective for the 
executive's actions to the extent necessary and sufficient. 
 
The President - Parliamentary systems, such as that of our 
country, usually have the functions of the President of the State 
and the Prime Minister or the Head of Government. The duties of 
the president of the state are usually to represent the country, 
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perform ceremonial duties as an embodiment of state authority, 
and provide civic leadership as an expression of state identity. 
 
Under the Kosovo Constitution, the post of president is largely a 
ceremonial post (Kosovo Const. art. V, par. 3), the fact that the 
president lacks credibility to intervene during political crises and 
is seen to carry luggage and bias towards the political party, and 
this seriously weakens institutional controls and balances. 
 
Pursuant to Article 4 paragraph 3, it is emphasized that the role of 
the President of the Republic of Kosovo is not endowed with 
executive powers, i.e. he is a symbolic leader of the state who 
plays a representative role at home and abroad and does not 
exercise executive power (Kosovo Const. art. V. par, 3,4). 
 
However, the President of the Republic of Kosovo may possess 
and exercise certain discretionary powers that may be associated 
with certain political interference as an arbitrator or constitutional 
guarantor, which will be dealt with in this study. 
 
Moreover, the President of Kosovo is a guarantor of the 
democratic functioning of the institutions of the Republic of 
Kosovo, in accordance with the constitution and is a permanent 
representative of the state. Its role can provide additional 
continuity and stability to the state, enable more inclusive 
representation, act as a figure of national unity, and can moderate 
political conflicts. 
 
The procedure for the election of the President of the Republic of 
Kosovo is regulated by the Constitution of Kosovo and LAW NO. 
03 / L-094 ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
KOSOVO. 
 
Since the first post-war parliamentary elections (2001) to date, 
Kosovo has had five presidents. Their election has been marred 
by institutional crises and numerous political bargains, and the 
Constitutional Court has 'cared' for the termination of both of 
them, whose judgments remain controversial today (KDI, 2015). 
 
The first President of the Republic of Kosovo was Mr. Fatmir 
Sejdiu, from the Democratic League of Kosovo. He was elected 
to the post after three rounds of voting, with 80 votes in favor, 12 
against and 17 abstentions, on February 10, 2006 (Kosovo Const. 
Art. 91, phar. 1,2,3). 
 
He failed to complete his mandate after he stepped down as 
president on September 27, 2010, following a Constitutional 
Court ruling that found Sejdiu had committed a serious violation 
of the Constitution by holding the post of president of the 
Democratic League of Kosovo and the President of Kosovo, 
though the post of DLK chairman was frozen. 
 
Following the resignation of Mr. Sejdiu, from the post of 
President of Kosovo, in order not to cause institutional vacuum, 
the Acting President until the election of another candidate, was 
appointed Mr. Jakup Krasniqi, who was from the Democratic 
Party of Kosovo, was in the position of Speaker of Parliament. 
 
On February 21, 2011, the Assembly of Kosovo elected 
President, Mr. Behgjet Pacolli from the New Kosovo Alliance 
party. This decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 
at the request of Sabri Hamiti and some other Members of 
Parliament, was overturned by the Constitutional Court of 
Kosovo in its decision, 'Clarification of Judgment in Case no. KO 
29/11 (Constitutional Court, KO 19/11). 
 
On February 21, 2011, the Assembly of Kosovo elected 
President, Mr. Behgjet Pacolli from the New Kosovo Alliance 
party. This decision of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 
at the request of Sabri Hamiti and several other deputies, was 
overturned by the Constitutional Court of Kosovo in its decision, 
'Clarification of Judgment in case no. KO 29/11 (Constitutional 
Court, KO 29/11). 
 
Following the Constitutional Court's decision, on 4 April 2011, 
Mr. Behgjet Pacolli resigned from the post of President of 
Kosovo. This post was held for the second time by Mr. Jakup 
Krasniqi, President of the Assembly of Kosovo. He was first 
appointed to the post last year, following the resignation of 
President Sejdiu. 
 
This court, in its judgment, declared the decision of the Kosovo 
Assembly of 21 February 2011 to appoint Behgjet Pacolli as 
President unconstitutional and declared it invalid as of March 30. 
According to her, the 34 deputies of the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (DLK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AFK) 
were entitled to the submission, because voting in the session did 
not have the proper quorum (two-thirds of the Assembly total) 
and there was also no opposition to Pacolli - as prescribed by the 
procedure for electing the president, which violated the country's 
Constitution (Constitutional Court, KO 29/11). 
 
Atifete Jahjaga was the joint candidate of DPK, DLK and ANK - 
Alliance for New Kosovo, based on the agreement reached 
between the leaders of these three political parties, under the 
mediation of the US ambassador to Pristina, Christopher Dell. 
 
On April 7, 2011, with 80 votes in favor, the Assembly of Kosovo 
elected former Kosovo Police Deputy Director General Atifete 
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Jahjagan to the post of presidents, while her deputy, ANK 
Member of Parliament, Suzana Novobërdaliu, received only 10 
votes, 10 more were invalid. 
 
Hashim Thaçi is President of the Republic of Kosovo, elected on 
February 26, 2016 in the Assembly of Kosovo. He was elected 
President of Kosovo, with 71 votes, only after the third round of 
voting in the Assembly, following the failure of the first and 
second rounds of his election as president. 
 
The process of electing Mr. Thaci for president in the Kosovo 
Assembly was followed by dramatic events. In the Assembly, the 
process of voting for the new presidency continued with only 83 
MPs present after the opposition was expelled from the session 
after numerous violent tear gas incidents. 
 
Opposition supporters, meanwhile, began clashes with police, 
throwing Molotov cocktails at them. Meanwhile, police 
responded with tear gas and pressure water (Gashi, 2016, 26 
February). 
 
Executive power is exercised by the Government, with the Prime 
Minister in charge. After 2008, elections were held for the 
Assembly of Kosovo, where the Democratic Party of Kosovo 
emerged as the most voted. 
 
After 2008, different types of governments were formed, but none 
of these governments succeeded in completing their full mandate. 
Thus, during this period, we can speak of an unstable situation 
with regard to the executive. 
 
Already in the first phase there were allegations of election fraud, 
leading to a repeat of elections in a number of constituencies, 
resulting in the formation of a coalition between the PDK and the 
AKR, as well as a number of smaller parties. The agreement to 
form a government between the two parties included a power-
sharing agreement, where the leader of the New Kosovo Alliance, 
Mr. Pacolli would be elected President and Thaçi would continue 
as Prime Minister (KDI, 2018). 
 
After the Constitutional Court found that the election of Mr. 
Pacolli as president was irregular and unconstitutional, due to the 
lack of necessary quorum in parliament during the voting 
procedure (LDK and the rest of the opposition boycotted the 
session during which Pacolli was elected), the ruling coalition did 
not break down, as Mr. Pacolli was elected Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
 
The discontent over the functioning of the government began as 
a result of a number of failures on the national front (visa 
liberalization with the EU) and the start of negotiations on 
normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo, with EU 
support. The engagement of Prime Minister Thaçi and PDK in 
these negotiations led him to become less and less engaged in 
governing the country together with the coalition. At the same 
time, allegations of corruption and abuse at high levels of 
government were increasingly spread by opposition, independent 
media, international actors and nongovernmental observers, 
further damaging the seemingly broad base of popular support 
that PDK enjoyed in 2007 (KDI, 2018). 
 
Although the exact motives for Thaci's decision to disrupt the 
coalition and call for early elections are not known. At this time, 
from his behavior and that of the DPK, it was clear that the 
continuation of the coalition with Pacolli and New Kosovo 
Alliance Party was considered politically harmful (KDI, 2018). 
 
The circumstances that led to the creation of the Mustafa 
government in 2017 were the circumstances that arose after the 
Kosovo Assembly elections. Following the announcement of the 
final results of the elections held on June 8, 2014, according to 
the publication of the Central Election Commission, the 
Democratic Party of Kosovo - PDK, together with the smaller 
parties in the coalition, received 222,181 votes or 31.38% and as 
such was the winner in this election. 
 
Opposition parties, the Democratic League of Kosovo LDK, the 
Self-Determination Movement - LVV, the Alliance for the Future 
of Kosovo - AAK and the Initiative for Kosovo, formed a post-
election coalition, then known as the VLAN, stating that they had 
a majority in the Assembly and were aiming to win the post of 
President of Parliament and the formation of the government. A 
coalition that has kept political and social life locked up for more 
than six months and only after the Constitutional Court's ruling 
came to this unblocking. 
 
The PDK-LDK coalition was created in 2014, after a long period 
of institutional blockade and uncertainty created after these 
elections. The creation of the 'Mustafa Government' appeared to 
have come as a result of bargains and negotiations with many 
unknowns, which led to the emergence of subsequent crises that 
aggravated Kosovo's political life and directly influenced the 
consolidation of its democracy. 
 
In 2016, Thaci left the government, where he had served as 





In 2016, Thaci left the government, where he served as Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to become 
President. 
 
The PDK President, Mr. Kadri Veseli, who held the post of 
Speaker of the Assembly of Kosovo, had an important role in his 
party, but not in the 'Mustafa Government'. In early 2017, he 
began a series of conversations with citizens to hear their 
concerns about the work and direction of government. Mr. 
Veseli's tour later resulted in a no-confidence motion against the 
government in Parliament, which passed with the support of all 
opposition parties as well as DPK MPs, leading to the fall of the 
Mustafa government, making it go once again early elections. 
 
Although the 2017 parliamentary elections brought about a major 
electoral overthrow, as the Vetevendosje Movement emerged as 
the most voted party in the party plan, they failed to influence the 
creation of a new government. The so-called PAN Coalition, 
consisting of PDK, AAK and Initiative for Kosovo, won the 
elections. 
 
Only three months after the June 11th elections, this coalition 
managed to form the new government and Kosovo to have its own 
government. On September 9, this winning PDK-AAK-NISMA 
coalition became possible only after the support given by Behgjet 
Pacolli's New Alliance for Kosovo (AKR) Party, and all minority 
MPs including the Serbian List. Sixty-one of the 120 members of 
the assembly voted for Ramush Haradinaj's cabinet. With a small 
majority, against a very strong opposition, Haradinaj's 
government could only survive until June 2018. When Haradinaj 
told the media and coalition members the reason for his 
resignation, he said that he had received the resignation invitation 
from the Special Court, in the capacity of a suspect, although 
there were no reports as to whether an indictment had been filed 
against Haradinaj (Fokus, 2019, 19, june). 
 
Weaknesses in the exercise of government have emerged in all 
government mandates, from the first, the Thaqi government to the 
last, Haradinaj. These governments were unable to overcome the 
ongoing internal tensions within the coalitions created by the 
hostility of the parties within it. The internal contradictions and 
short time of governance made them never fulfill their 
government program. "Moreover, the complexity of political 
bargaining - with office control, the main object of such talks - 
has also led to a rapid increase in the number of parties in 
government, the number of deputy prime ministers, the number 
of cabinet ministries, and the number of deputy ministers. With 
the current government of twenty-one ministers, the small 
country of two million inhabitants boasts a larger cabinet than 
Germany's" ((Fokus, 2019, 19, June). 
5. Conclusions 
The challenges that Kosovo faces in consolidating democracy are 
many and varied, including the ongoing process of state-building 
that requires the engagement of the entire political elite, whether 
in opposition or in government, for radical reform. Harmonious 
and adequate functioning according to the constitutional 
provisions of the basic state institutions, adequate choice of 
policies in a context where democratic norms do not suffer from 
the opposition of individuals to use the lack of adequate 
constitutional remedies in the creation of individual authority. 
Despite an advanced degree of democratic stability that has been 
booming in recent years, it cannot be said that Kosovo has met 
the conditions necessary for the consolidation of democracy. 
Perhaps, what can be said for sure is that Kosovo has successfully 
passed the stage of democratic transition. 
The performance of these three institutions should focus on 
removing the difficulties and problems described above, trying to 
make their competencies work, harmonizing efforts to ensure a 
strong rooting of democratic governance, in the country's political 
landscape at all levels. 
Particular attention should be focused on co-operation and 
harmonization of actions between these democratic institutions, 
enhancing institutional capacity to adapt with the social forces 
that lead to the development of the country. 
As the consolidation of democracy depends on the exercise and 
empowerment of these institutions, the deepening of institutional 
cooperation is crucial in making important decisions for the state, 
in the ultimate control of decision-making by complementing and 
balancing adherence to international standards and recognized 
procedures as well as has a greater response to local values and 
forms of political legitimacy. 
The arguments presented above, which in many cases are part of 
the public debate, I believe, are sufficient evidence that basic 
constitutional institutions are failing to perform their key 
constitutional functions in the name of the common good. Their 
constitutional activity often transcends the interests of the 
individual himself and the political groups of origin, despite 
pressure from local and international public opinion. The progress 
report presented by the European Commission states that the 
Assembly should substantially improve its work as a forum for 
constructive dialogue and political representation, but also to 
ensure proper checks and balances. Furthermore, the Assembly 
lacks the powers and capacity to effectively oversee the agencies 
/ bodies reporting directly to it. In most governments, as was the 
case in the latter, in 2017, the political parties created coalition 
governments with national priority EU integration and other 
international institutions. But instead of realizing the national 
priorities presented, it came to the division of spheres of influence 
between the ruling coalition, which directly affected the 
weakened position of the Prime Minister in the capacity of person 
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in charge of the Cabinet on the one hand, and the encouragement 
of corrupt practices within the particular government spheres on 
the other hand. The end of government in 2019 was characterized 
by disagreements between the Prime Minister and the Speaker of 
Parliament, who was the leader of the largest party in 
government, which contributed to the destabilization of the 
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